Two days ago, I found myself in a familiar scenario. It was 10am, and I had just gotten out of a lecture. I now had an hour to finish the assigned reading for my Philosophy of Mind seminar, which would begin at 11am.
I also needed to eat lunch sometime in that hour, as I wouldn’t have another opportunity until 2pm — and I certainly wasn’t going to last until then.
A friend of mine (Jacob, who studies Philosophy & Politics and was in the same lecture) joined me in the Palatine Café. He promptly pulled out his reading glasses and got to work, flipping to a page in a (rather large) book. I vaguely recognized it from our British politics module’s additional (i.e. not required) reading list.
I, on the other hand, bought a sandwich and coffee and set about finishing the dreaded philosophy reading. As I remarked to Veronica (who, quite excitingly, is taking Philosophy of Music this year), “Philosophy’s all fun and games until it’s time to do the reading.”
Don’t get me wrong, there are few things I love more than a foray into philosophy, especially ethics. The spirited discussion, the surge of conviction that quickly crashes on the shores of a valid (and increasingly convincing) retort, the (strangely addicting) dissonance that follows, when you realize your moral views are just as flawed, just as untenable, as everyone else’s.
There’s something comforting in the fact that we are still arguing about the same things, trying to answer the same questions that plagued the likes of Plato, Aristotle. That maybe some things are unknowable.
It’s one thing to love philosophy when you’re not on a deadline. On that day, however, I needed to get through 20 pages of possibly the most dense argument I’ve ever had the pleasure of reading — the causal closure argument.
I won’t go into it too deeply here, if only to spare my brain, but causal closure relates to a “perennial issue in the philosophy of mind” (Lowe, pp. 8): the mind-body problem. This problem is more or less exactly what it sounds like; it’s the problem of how the mind relates to the body.
Lowe reframes it to how “subjects of experience” are related to their bodies, but for the less rigorous purposes of this newsletter, we can think about it in the personal context. How are you related to your (physical) body?
There are two main camps in answering this question. Physicalists have a simple answer — you’re one and the same. In their view, you simply are — identical with — your body, or perhaps (more specifically) some part of it, like the brain.
Dualists, as the name suggests, disagree. Substance dualists in particular maintain that there are two kinds of substances, one material and another immaterial. Your brain (and the rest of your body) falls in the former category. You, on the other hand, are an immaterial substance entirely distinct from your body.
It’s important to note that, in this view, the two types of substances share no similar properties. Your body is located in physical space, it is spatially extended, and it has a mass. You (or your mind, if it’s helpful to think in terms of the mind-body distinction) have none of these properties. You (in this sense) are not located in physical space; you can’t point to a particular spot in the brain, for instance, and accurately say “that’s me.” Additionally, you (unlike your body) are capable of thoughts and emotions.
Importantly, though, most substance dualists want to maintain that you/your mind can causally interact with your body, and vice versa. For instance, you breaking your arm (a physical event) can cause you to feel pain (a mental event). Alternatively, you feeling extremely nervous can cause your heart to beat faster, or your hands to become sweaty.
Given that the mind and body are so utterly different, and share no similar properties whatsoever, interactive substance dualists have a hard time explaining how the two causally interact with one another. How can a mental event cause a physical event (and vice versa)?
Physicalists present an argument — the causal closure argument — that concludes at least some mental events are identical with physical events. Unfortunately, I’m not well-versed enough (yet) to accurately present the argument here, and I’m sure some of you have had enough metaphysics for one sitting.
For those interested, I’ll attach this link to an article on PhilPapers, which goes into the argument (as far as I can tell, anyone can download it without institution access). It isn’t the same Lowe piece we read for the seminar, but it covers the same topic.
For those who have reached their metaphysics-quota for the day, you can probably imagine how I felt Tuesday morning. I did make it to the end of the article, and the conclusion ended with possibly the most humorous few sentences I’ve come across in an assigned reading.
Essentially, Lowe went into some issues with the causal closure argument, and like most philosophy papers, the conclusion wasn’t very conclusive at all. “Once again…it seems that we should keep an open mind about this question,” it read. And here’s the pièce de résistance:
“That we have come to no firm conclusion about either of the main questions addressed in this chapter should not disconcert us unduly, however. These questions are amongst the most difficult in the whole of philosophy and it would be surprising if we had been able to resolve them conclusively when so many other able thinkers have failed to do so.”
Got to love philosophy!
Thank you for reading this far (and for indulging my philosophical tangents), and I’ll be back in your inbox with the next issue soon! As always, a reply (even just to say how you’re doing) is always appreciated.
Hope you’re doing well!
Kaylyn
P.S. As much as this piece might take a lighter tone at the less-attractive sides of philosophy, I seriously love my subject. For those who don’t remember, I study PPE (Philosophy, Politics & Economics), and it’s quite possibly one of the best choices I’ve made.
Let me know if you’re interested in hearing more about what we’re covering in PPE — I’d love to do a deep dive into topics like this every so often!
007: On philosophy readings
I’ve missed our philosophy chats! I started reading Keith Frankish’s Illusionism: as a Theory of Consciousness last month which attempts to do away with the hard problem of consciousness in favour for the ‘illusion problem’. I wish I had the time to actually read it all properly. Looking forward to hearing all about your philosophy modules in December!!!